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Prospects for Investment in the Soviet Union:
A Survey of Political and Economic Factors
by Gail L. Eggleston*
I. A Brief History of United States-Soviet Commercial Relations
Significant commercial contacts existed between the United States
and Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia accounted for
one-tenth of U.S. exports in 1911, and supplied substantial portions of
U.S. naval stores. 1 In the early years of the Soviet regime, American
aid contributed significantly to the rehabilitation of the Soviet
economy; under Lenin's New Economic Policy, concessions were
granted to American capitalists for the exploitation of Soviet natural
resources and the establishment of factories and mines. 2 During the
early Stalinist era, American entrepreneurs expanded their involve-
ment in the development of Soviet industry; by 1931 the Soviet market
was absorbing nearly two-thirds of all U.S. exports of agricultural
equipment and power-driven metal-working machinery. 3 Such impor-
tant contacts led to U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in
1933, the establishment of the Export-Import Bank in 1934 to finance
transactions, and the grant of most-favored-nation [MFN] treatment in
1935. 4 When the Lend Lease agreement was signed in 1942, American
exports to the Soviet Union had reached $2.5 billion per year.5
This mutually profitable relationship ended in 1947 due to the
advent of the Cold War and disagreements over Lend Lease repayment
terms. The United States imposed an embargo upon the shipment of
strategic commodities to communist countries under the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949.6 Private loans to countries in default on their debts to
the United States were prohibited under the Johnson Act of 1934, 7 and
the MFN status of Communist countries was revoked by the 1951
Trade Agreements Extension Act." During the Korean War the United
States adopted the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Battle Act) of 19519
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'Wilson, Katz, Porter, Pounds and Rogers, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Regulations, in
SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE SEVENTIES, A Compendium of Papers Submitted
to the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 638, 639 (1973) [hereinafter
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promoting an embargo on Western goods "which might contribute to
the military strength of the Soviet bloc." 1"
Not until 1956 was commercial contact re-established through the
decontrol of certain categories of exports to the Soviet Union. Com-
mercial relations were further advanced by the 1959 summit talks
between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, which led to a narrowing of the
definition of strategic goods exduded from trade.11 During the Ken-
nedy and Johnson administrations, the Johnson Act was reinterpreted
to permit medium-term credits linked to U.S. export transactions, and
U.S. longshoremen agreed to allow fifty percent of export cargoes to be
shipped in non-U.S. bottoms. These developments permitted the 1964
sale of $110 million worth of wheat. 12 Further steps were taken to
improve the competitive position of American businessmen; in 1966
more items were removed from the list of controlled exports, and a bill
styled The East-West Trade Relations Act was introduced to eliminate
trade discriminations against Communist countries. 13 The bill failed to
pass in 1966 and again in 1969, but the Export Administration Act of
1969 (which replaced the Export Control Act of 1949) loosened many
restrictions on trade with Communist nations. 14 None of these actions,
however, substantially affected the level of U.S.-Soviet trade.
In the post-Stalin period, Soviet economic policy has encouraged
the development of commercial relations with industrialized Western
nations as a means to achieve high industrial and agricultural growth
rates. The Soviet Union has developed a considerable trade with
Western Europe, exchanging raw materials for advanced equipment.
Not until 1971, when export credits of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States [Eximbank] again became available to socialist coun-
tries, 15 did the United States begin to participate actively in trade with
the Soviet Union. Reciprocal visits by U.S. and Soviet commercial
delegations initiated a new era in East-West trade; in November, 1971 a
group headed by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce traveled to Moscow
and in May, 1972 the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Trade came to
Washington. 16
These exchanges laid the foundation for the Moscow Summit of
May, 1972, where President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev
agreed to establish a Joint Commercial Commission to negotiate a
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comprehensive trade agreement and essential supporting agree-
ments. 17 The Commission rapidly achieved significant improvements
in trade relations and continues to be an important force in their
development; 8 conclusion of bilateral trade agreements in each of the
specified areas came by October 1972.
On July 8, 1972 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with respect
to purchases of grain whereby it would purchase at least $750 million
in U.S. grains for delivery over a three year period, if the United States
would make $500 million credit available through the Commodity
Credit Corporation.' 9 Another grain purchase agreement having a
term of five years was concluded on October 20, 1975, indicating a
policy of continuing agricultural interdependence. 20
The Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, signed on
October 14, 1972,21 was designed to promote two objectives: the
increase of maritime commerce between the two nations by reciproc-
ally opening major ports of call to specified types of vessels and the
provision of equal opportunity for vessels of both nations to participate
in that increased trade. 22 The agreement opened forty specified ports
in each country to access by vessels of the other, established freight
rates and gave the vessels of each the opportunity to carry at least
one-third of all cargoes moving between the two nations. The agree-
ment was a boon to the American shipping industry, increasing sub-
stantially employment of the U.S. bulk cargo fleet. An upward trend in
laid-up tonnage was reversed, due primarily to the transport of grain
to the Soviet Union. 23
The two governments concluded an agreement on the settlement
of Lend Lease, reciprocal aid and claims on October 18, 1972.24 Under
this agreement the United States was to receive at least $722 million
over the period ending July 1, 2001,25 as payment on loans which had
been outstanding since World War II. Several installments were paid,
but the balance was conditioned upon the extension of MFN treatment
to the Soviet Union.
'
7U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. -SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972, at 1 (1972).
"
8 Brower, The Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission: A Continuum of Sub-
Summitry, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 77 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
19Starr, The Evolving US Legal Framework For US-USSR Trade, in BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH THE USSR 1 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
20[1976] - U.S.T. - ; T.I.A.S. No. 8206.
21[1972] 23 U.S.T. 3573; T.I.A.S. No. 7513.
22U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 17, at 23.
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employment. See Wilson, et al., supra note 1, at 649.
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A comprehensive Trade Agreement was also signed; the nine
articles, three annexes and accompanying exchange of letters created a
new legal framework for the development of U.S.-Soviet trade. 26
Article I granted MFN status, providing that each country would
reduce tariffs on products from the other country to the level applied to
equivalent products imported from other nations. Anticipating actions
by both governments to facilitate the exchange of goods and services
between the two countries, Article 2 projected a tripling of bilateral
trade over the three year period of the agreement. To prevent import-
induced disruption of either country's domestic market, a safeguard
procedure was established in Article 3. Article 4 required that all
payments be in U.S. dollars or other freely convertible currency agreed
upon. The establishment of a U.S. Commercial Office in Moscow and a
Soviet Trade Representation in Washington was authorized by Article
5. According to Article 6, U.S. firms could establish accredited busi-
ness facilities in Moscow and Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations
[FTO's] could be established in the United States. Article 7 encouraged
settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration under the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. Protection of government security interests was co-
vered in Article 8. The final article provided for effectuation of the
agreement and authorized further meetings of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission.
A separate Agreement on Financing Procedures between the U.S.
Eximbank and the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Bank was also signed on
October 18, 1972. Unlike the Lend Lease Settlement, it was to be
effective even if the Trade Agreement was never implemented. Under
this agreement Eximbank has extended direct credits in connection
with export sales to the Soviet Union. The credit facilities of the Soviet
Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank) and those of the FTO's are
likewise available to American importers. 28
In 1972 an Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific,
Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Exchanges 2 9 was reached,
and a Joint Commission on Science and Technology was established. A
summit meeting held in Washington in 1973 yielded a proposal for a
bilateral tax treaty with provisions to avoid double taxation. 30 In the
June 1974 Moscow Summit, several trade-related agreements were
concluded, notably a long-term Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. The agreement specifies areas
26 Agreement Regarding Trade, October 18, 1972, reproduced in U.S.-SOVIET
COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 17.
Z7Wilson, et al., supra note 1, at 654.
281d.
29Id. at 655; [1972] 23 U.S.T. 791; T.I.A.S. No. 7343.
30See Cole and Maguire, Tax Consequences of Transactions with the USSR, in BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 139 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
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in which the governments will encourage development of projects. To
exchange information and forecasts of basic economic, industrial and
commercial trends, yearly meetings of experts are to be held under the
auspices of the Joint Commercial Commission. 3 1
The Soviet Union repudiated the Trade Agreement of 1972 after
Congress added the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of
1974,32 and amended the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) Act in
1975. 3 3 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment conditioned the granting of
MFN treatment to non-market economy countries upon free emigra-
tion of all citizens. The Eximbank Act in 1975 made extension of U.S.
government credits to the Soviet Union also dependent on changes in
Soviet emigration policy. 34
Soviet repudiation of the trade agreement caused no significant
deterioration of the business climate for American companies. Delays
in the negotiation of new contracts and preferential treatment for other
Western countries' firms have been reported. 35 However, Soviet offi-
cials have made it clear that they expect trade with the United States to
grow despite the failure of the trade agreement. 36
Although the expected political rapprochement has not occurred,
both countries expect substantial economic benefits from expanded
commercial relations and several new forms of commercial interaction
have developed. Because the Soviet government conducts all foreign
trade as a monopoly, the U.S. government is more active in foreign
trade with the Soviet Union than with other foreign trading partners in
order to equalize the bargaining positions of the parties.
Greater participation by the U.S. government is achieved in sev-
eral ways, including activity by the Joint Commercial Commission in
monitoring trade at the operational level. The Bureau of East-West
Trade, a unit of the Domestic and International Business Administra-
tion of the U.S. Department of Commerce, functions as the major
government mechanism for assisting U.S. firms interested in trade
with Eastern countries. 37 It contains the executive secretariat for the
Joint Commercial Commission and provides detailed economic infor-
mation on socialist countries for U.S. firms. 38
Since 1973 the United States has maintained a Commercial Office
in Moscow to promote the development of U.S.-Soviet economic
relations and to expand the services available to U.S. businessmen in
3 1Starr, supra note 19.
3219 U.S.C. § 2432 (Supp. V 1975).
3312 U.S.C. § 635e(b) (Supp. V 1975).
3 4Berman, Soviet American Trade in a Legal Perspective, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
217 (1975).
3S4 Bus. INT'L CORPORATION, EASTERN EUROPE REPORTS 20 (1975).
361d. at 67.
37U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 74-01 at 10 (1974).
381d.
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the U.S.S.R. 3 9 The 1973 Washington Summit produced a U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, which consists of representa-
tives of U.S. private business and Soviet FTO's. The Council seeks to,
develop commercial relations and industrial cooperation by acting as a
resource center for operational information. 40
II. Industrial Cooperation Agreements
Commercial transactions between American firms and Soviet or-
ganizations have increased in complexity as well as quantity. While
individual import and export transactions still constitute the bulk of
bilateral trade, a new arrangement has been developed to meet the
economic needs of both countries. The "industrial cooperation agree-
ment" is more complex than a simple sales or purchase, but less
complex than an ordinary joint venture. Traditional joint ventures are
infeasible since the Soviet Union presently forbids both private owner-
ship of the means of production and foreign participation in economic
planning. 4 1
In the context of U.S.-Soviet economic relations, industrial coop-
eration agreements have been defined as those "between enterprises
belonging to different economic systems which go beyond traditional
export/import operations based on monetary settlement and include
set reciprocal product/service flows extending over a number of
years." '42 The usual characteristics of such projects are: 43
1) major impact on the Soviet economy,
2) substantial cost,
3) expected duration of ten to fifteen years,
4) purchase of equipment requirements on long term credit,
5) reimbursement of credits at least in part by delivery of product of
enterprise,
6) export sales of product continue after repayment of original
investment.
Four distinct types of industrial cooperation with Western enter-
prises have emerged: licensing with payment in product, turnkey with
payment in product, coproduction and specialization, and subcontract-
ing.44 Licensing agreements involve the manufacture of goods accord-
ing to specifications under a license granted by the Western firm. Pay-
391d. at 12.
4Old.
41J. KOSNIK, NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION: FINANCING THE NORTH
STAR JOINT VENTURE PROJECT 15 (1975).
4 2Smith, Industrial Cooperation Agreements: Soviet Experience and Practice, in SOVIET
ECONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint
Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 767, 769 (1976).
43Id. at 780.
4 4Peterson, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16
HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 391-92 (1975).
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ment is in finished products or components that are exported by the
licensor. An example of this arrangement is the recent agreement with
Phillip Morris, Inc. for the production of Marlboro cigarettes in the
Soviet Union. Along with royalties, payments are to be in Soviet tobacco
for the use in Marlboro's European brands and for use in the develop-
ment of a test program for tobacco production in the Moldavian Repub-
lic. 45
The most common type of industrial cooperation project is the
turnkey arrangement. The Western firm supplies the entire production
facility, including design and construction of the plant, equipment,
personnel training and technical assistance .46 At least partial payment is
usually made in the resultant product, although this is not required if
Soviet internal needs can absorb the entire output of the plant. 4 7 U.S.
firms have contracted with the Soviet Union to provide turnkey plants
in several areas:
- PPG Industries 48 and Reichhold Chemicals Corp.4 9 are to con-
struct plastic resin plants;
- Internex International is to provide a plant for the manufacture of
car radiators, heaters, oil coolers and other similar equipment for
the Kama River truck project;50
- Chemtex Corp. is to construct artificial fiber and foil-making
facilities;51
- General Instruments is to provide a plant, technology, compo-
nents and assembling equipment for the production of pocket
calculators, in a $28 million deal;5 2
- Allis Chalmers Corp. signed a contract to construct an iron-
pelletizing plant for $50 million;5 3
- Union Carbide signed a preliminary agreement for the joint de-
sign and construction of a ferro-manganese plant;5 4
- DuPont is to provide a plant for the production of chromium
dioxide for audio-visual tapes;5 5
- Pullman Corp. is to construct four ammonia fertilizer plants; 5 6
- Bendix Corp. expects to finalize an agreement to construct a plant
456 Bus. INT'L CORPORATION, BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE 39 (1977).
4 6OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 5-6.
475 BUS. INT'L CORPORATION, BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE 370 (1976).
4 8 Osofsky, supra note 25, at 72.
4 9EASTERN EUROPE REPORTS, supra note 35, at 155.
50 d at 366.
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for the production of spark plugs, with payment in product to be
sold outside the Soviet Union;5 7
FMC Corp. 58 and Arthur G. McKee & Co. 5 9 have contracted to
build baby food plants.
An increasingly popular variation in licensing and turnkey coopera-
tion agreements is a counterpurchase provision. This allows the West-
ern firm to receive payment in raw materials or in a product not pro-
duced under the license or facilities that are the subject of the contract.
An example of a counterpurchase provision in a licensing arrangement
is Pepsico's agreement to supply licenses and bottling plants for the
production of soda in the Soviet Union in exchange for Russian vodka
which is imported into the United States. This arrangement has proven
so successful that the 1972 contract was renewed and expanded in 1976
to provide for construction of a second bottling plant. 60
Less common are coproduction and specialization agreements.
Components of the final product or members of a line of products are
manufactured by each party, then parts are exchanged and each party
independently assembles and markets the completed product or entire
line. 61 Also in limited use are subcontracting arrangements, which may
function as the means for product delivery under a more comprehensive
industrial cooperation project, or to supplement the Western firm's
production capacity. 62 These two types of arrangements may be
employed to take advantage of the lower Soviet wage scale for labor-
intensive projects.63
Most industrial cooperation projects involve the development of
energy resources and the production of heavy machinery, chemicals
and computer technology. The Soviet Foreign Plan for 1976 through
1980 encourages the development of energy resources.
The joint exploration and exploitation of the extensive mineral and
fuel resources located in Siberia are essential for the Soviets to achieve
projected growth rates on schedule. 64 The exploitation requires U.S.
technical assistance in the areas of metallurgy, coal extraction, trans-
portation and power transmission. 65 The Soviets also need labor-
saving machinery and special Arctic technology due to the insufficient
176 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 46.
5 81d. at 72.
19ld. at 159.
605 BUS. INT'L CORPORATION, EASTERN EUROPE REPORTS 14 (1976).
6 1OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra, note 37, at 6-7.6 2Smith, supra note 42, at 771.
63Soviet workers have the lowest wage scale in Eastern Europe, where wages are
substantially lower than in the West. 5 EASTERN EUROPE REPORTS, supra note 60, at 70.64Siberia contains the world's second largest oil deposits, estimated at 834 billion
barrels; the world's largest natural gas deposits, an estimated 6.6 trillion tons, and
untapped sources of enormous amounts of hydroelectric power. Bus. INT'L CORPORA-
TION, DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S.S.R. at 1-15 (1975).
65C. FRIESEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EAST-WEST TRADE 17 (1976).
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labor force and sub-zero temperatures. 66 Because of the Soviet need for
U.S. assistance, resource exploitation projects are likely to become
more common. 67 However, the substantial capital outlays and long-
term repayment provisions required for such cooperation projects
ordinarily make them feasible only for large multinational corpora-
tions. 68
During the 25th Party Congress, Premier Kosygin stressed the
importance of industrial cooperation projects in achieving economic
growth. General Secretary Brezhnev emphasized the benefits of the
buy-back features of these projects. 69
Industrial cooperation projects provide an opportunity for Soviet
enterprises to gain Western technology and familiarity with Western
managerial skills and marketing techniques. 70 Perhaps most impor-
tant, these arrangements enable the Soviet Union to obtain skills,
technology and commodities for which its hard currency reserves
would be inadequate to purchase outright. The Soviet Union is thus
able to avoid further increase in its hard currency deficit, which soared
to $6.3 billion in 1975. 71 Increased output in raw material production
will also generate more hard currency to improve the Soviet balance of
payments.
III. Soviet Economic Organization and Trade Procedures
Experience of U.S. firms indicates that conclusion of an industrial
cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union involves years of negoti-
ation and considerable bureaucratic delay, due to the centrally-
planned Soviet economy.
A. Central Planning System
All Soviet economic activity is conducted in accordance with a
plan drafted by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Gosplan is
6 6DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S.S.R., supra note 64 at, 1-17.
6 7The Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology has signed cooperation
agreements with Occidental Petroleum, Gulf Oil, Phillips Petroleum, Amoco, Stan-
dard Oil of Indiana, Armco Steel, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., Bechtel Corporation,
and other firms desirous of obtaining Soviet oil, coal, natural gas, iron, and other
resources. United States Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Ag-
reements with the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, an unpub-
lished list supplied by the U.S.S.R. Affairs Division, Bureau of East-West Trade, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
6 8FRIESEN, SUpra note 65, at 12. According to a 1976 survey, 40 of the 53 U.S. firms
which had then signed industrial cooperation agreements with the SCST were among
the 300 largest corporations ranked by Fortune 500. Theriot, U.S. Governmental and
Private Industry Cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Fields of Science and Technology, in
SOVIET ECONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE, supra note 42, 739 at 749.6 9Smith, supra note 42, at 768-69.
7 0Peterson, supra note 44, at 396.
7
'Farrell and Ericson, Soviet Trade and Payments with the West, in SOVIET ECONOMY
IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE, supra note 42, 727 at 728.
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under the policy directives of the Politburo, which is the supreme
policy-making body of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party. Government agencies make all economic decisions, supervise
their execution, set prices and own the means of production. 2 A
hierarchy of economic plans is promulgated with long-range plans to
establish general directions for ten or fifteen years. Five-Year Plans set
targets for production, investment, output mix and growth for that
period.73 More specific annual plans detail production quotas, allocate
resources among industries and regions and allow for adjustments
based on production figures of the previous year. Each industry and
region is the subject for annual and monthly plans, which contain even
more specialized sub-plans specifying the input and output alloted for
individual enterprises.
The entire system of plans is formulated and administered under
the supervision of Gosplan, which in turn delegates supervision of the
various industries to the All-Union Ministries and supervision of the
regions to the Republic and regional Gosplans.7 4 The planning agen-
cies draft preliminary plans after receiving reports from industrial
enterprises on their productive capacity and estimated requirements.
After a lengthy process of sending the plans to higher authorities for
approval after each modification, the final national plan is ratified by
the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Once, approved,
all transactions must conform to the national plan since it has the force
of law. 75
B. Foreign Trade System
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade coordinates all foreign trade
transactions. The Ministry formulates and administers rules and plans
for import and export of goods, negotiates trade agreements with
foreign countries, directs the activities of Foreign Trade Organizations
and Trade Representations, formulates and administers customs rules
and issues licenses for the conduct of trade.7 6 Within the Ministry of
Foreign Trade in 1976, the Soviets established a new Department for
Compensation Projects with Capitalist Countries, in order to alleviate
the organizational obstacles facing cooperation agreements. 77 This
department is expected to increase the flexibility of terms in coopera-
tion agreements since it has the power to make arrangements between
FTO's for counterpurchase agreements. The department should also
72U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 74-25 at 4 (1974).
731d.
741d. at 5.
75Kiralfy, The U.S.S.R., in EAST-WEST BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 316 (R. Starr. ed.
1974).
76Berman and Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign Trade, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
WITH THE U.S.S.R. 27 (R. Starr. ed. 1975).
775 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 332.
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reduce the number of contacts a Western firm must make by forcing
one industrial ministry to provide products necessary for another
ministry to obtain commodities from the West.78
Foreign Trade Organizations are the instrumentalities through which
the Soviet state engages in foreign trade. Each of the
more than sixty FTO's handles trade transactions of a specific charac-
ter, defined in terms of a general type of product or service. The FTO's
act as intermediaries between foreign firms and the Soviet enterprises
which are importing goods, exporting goods or both. There are no
legal links between Soviet enterprises and foreign firms. 79 Each FTO is
a legally independent entity with its own assets and with civil liability
on the contracts it signs. The Soviet state is not liable for the obliga-
tions of the FTO nor is any FTO liable for the obligations of any other
organization.8" The FTO's operate on basic commercial principles in
concluding contracts on behalf of Soviet industrial ministries and
enterprises and have wide latitude in determining the conditions of
these transactions within the scope of their authority. 81 Actual pur-
chasing decisions are made by the enterprises which will use the
imports, often based on recommendations of the State Committee for
Science and Technology and on overall political and economic consid-
erations. 82
The State Committee for Science and Technology [SCST] is re-
sponsible for planning the development of technology for the entire
Soviet economy. No Soviet enterprise can obtain funds for scientific or
technological research and development without this Committee's
approval. 83 While not empowered to enter - ntracts with foreign
firms, the SCST can conclude agreements o i foreign firms as an
initial step in selecting foreign suppliers of teci.nology and equipment
to be integrated into the economic plan. Over fifty U.S. firms have
signed these Science and Technology agreements.8 4 After the SCST
selects the firms to be involved and arranges financing, it then pro-
ceeds to supervise the project and coordinate it with other research and
development projects.
Working closely with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the SCST
is the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce, which is an independent
organization of over 1,800 members, including the FTO's, industrial
enterprises, and other economic organizations. 85 The Chamber of
7 81d.
79Kiralfy, supra note 75, at 313.
8 Berman and Bustin, supra note 76, at 31.
81OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 13.
82Id.
83Berman and Bustin, supra note 76, at 36.
84U.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements with
the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, supra note 67.
8
"OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 13.
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Commerce establishes links with foreign economic organizations, or-
ganizes trade fairs, receives foreign trade delegations, sends Soviet
trade delegations abroad, handles international patent applications,
and issues certificates of origin, goods inspection, and customs clear-
ance. 86 The Chamber also maintains the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission [FTAC] and the Maritime Arbitration Commission to
settle international commercial disputes.87
C. Contracting with the Soviet Union
Soviet FTO's have "standard form" contracts specifically designed
for transactions with Western trading partners. A Western firm may
obtain provisions that vary to a certain extent, depending on the
relative bargaining power of the parties in the particular deal. Pro-
longed negotiations will result for foreign firms seeking significant
variations that require the FTO to consult with superior authority. The
FTO representatives will be informed as to the performance record of
the Western firm and concessions granted by it on other projects.
However, Western negotiators will probably not be able to acquire
comparable data on the FTO or end-use Ministry because the Soviets
are secretive and other firms are unwilling to reveal the details of their
transactions with the Soviets. 88 Experience has shown that the FTO
negotiators are tactically very skillful and a company "may find that a
deal can only be concluded with the Soviets at a high business risk." 89
Generally, contracts with Soviet organizations are more detailed
than those among Western parties and are interpreted very literally so
that in practice linguistic problems have not arisen. The Soviet law of
contracts is much the same as that of the civil law countries. 90 Certain
standard contract provisions have regularly caused concern to Western
56Berman and Bustin, supra note 76, at 134.
8 7The standard Soviet foreign trade contract contains an arbitration clause, with
the preferred forum being the FTAC in Moscow. While an element of mistrust on the
part of Western firms is natural as the FTAC is controlled by Soviet authorities "it is
generally acknowledged that Moscow FTAC has a good record for sensible, impartial
decisions."
Soviet policy in favor of arbitration is very strong. The U.S.S.R. is a party to both
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration. Under these Conventions the Soviet FTO's will agree to submit to
arbitration in the country of the foreign claimant or a mutually acceptable third
country, sometimes specifying the Rules of Procedure of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. If no procedural rules have been specified, as frequently
happens, past East-West arbitrations held in Stockholm have been conducted under
the Swedish Arbitration Act and the Regulations governing the Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Norberg and Stein, Arbitration of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Trade Disputes, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 175, at 177-81.
(R. Starr ed. 1975).
88 OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 16.
89 Starr, Contracting with Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations, in BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 87, 88 (R. Starr ed. 1975).9
°Kiralfy, supra note 75, at 323.
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trading partners. Arbitration clauses frequently contain no provision
as to choice of law or rules of procedure and fail to mention whether
the parties have the right to agree on another form of dispute settle-
ment. 91 However, Soviet law permits the parties to specify the country
whose law shall apply to the transaction. In the absence of express
agreement, Soviet law follows the principle of lex loci contractus, the
place to be determined by Soviet law, which for contracts concluded by
correspondence is the country where the acceptance of the offer is
received. 92 The parties should expressly state the agreed terms.
Soviet organizations often interpret force majeure clauses differently
than other countries, since the centrally planned Soviet
economy is subject to serious disruption when contractual obligations
are not fulfilled. Specifically, the FTO's exclude labor strikes and
material shortages as excuses for nonperformance, but seek to include
unilateral acts of Government. 93 All force majeure possibilities should
be written in the contract in specific language rather than general
terms.
Clauses dealing with sanctions normally require strict perfor-
mance guarantees and impose severe penalties for failure to perform to
the letter of the contract. Specific performance rather than damages is
the focus of a contract with a Soviet organization; therefore, the
Western company should be careful not to overcommit its abilities and
resources. 94
Formalities are extremely important to the validity of Soviet con-
tracts. Two authorized persons must sign every contract, but it may be
difficult for a foreigner to learn the persons authorized to act for a
given organization. 95 The doctrine of ultra vires is strictly applied in the
Soviet Union, so a contract is valid only if made with the FTO having
authority in the relevant area of the economy. 96
The governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, in the
1972 Trade Agreement, provided that commercial contracts between
Soviet FTO's and U.S. firms "will generally be concluded on terms
customary in international commercial practice."' 97 However, trade
customs do not apply where the law which governs execution of the
contract expressly regulates the disputed issue, or where the parties
agree to depart from established trade custom. 98 The Joint Commercial
9 1Stein, Clauses in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Contracts, in AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE:
A JOINT SEMINAR ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, 109, 111-112 (U.S. Dep't
of Commerce 1975).
92Ginsberg, International Trade Customs, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLY 325, 327
(1975).
93OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 17.
94 Starr, supra note 89, at 94.
95Stein, supra note 91, at 113.
9 61d.
97Agreement Regarding Trade, supra note 26, art. 11(2).
"Ginsberg, supra note 92, at 325.
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Commission is empowered to "monitor... U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial
relations,... resolving issues that may be of interest to both par-
ties.. . ."99 Thus standard provisions which cannot be compromised to
the satisfaction of both parties and in conformity with custom may be
referred to the Committee for intergovernment consideration. 10 0
D. Industrial Property Protection
Industrial property protection is available to U.S. nationals under
Soviet patent, trademark and industrial design laws through the Pa-
tent Bureau of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce. The Bureau serves
as exclusive agent for all applications from foreigners to the State
Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. 10 The U.S.S.R. is a party
to the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property, thus
U.S. nationals are entitled to the same protections as provided for
Soviet nationals. 102
Inventions are protected by patents and inventors' certificates;
both certify recognition, priority and authorship. A patent lasts fifteen
years and gives the inventor exclusive right to the invention in the
U.S.S.R. 10 3 An inventor's certificate, which is permanent, gives the
state the exclusive right to the invention and entitles the inventor to
guaranteed payments based on use and privileges specified by law. °4
Soviet nationals usually acquire inventor's certificates since all means
of production are state-owned and the inventor cannot produce the
product. 0 5 Foreigners prefer to acquire patents because the recog-
nized ownership rights serve as a basis for negotiating licensing
agreements with Soviet organizations and for preventing importation
of products which it covers. 10 6
A foreign national is entitled to a "right of priority" for patent and
trademark applications, according to which an application in the
U.S.S.R. within one year of the original foreign filing will date back to
that first filing. 10 7 The exclusive right of the foreign national may be
limited by the "right of prior use" which allows the Soviet enterprise to
continue to use an invention without payment of compensation if it
was in use before the application was filed. 10 8 Absolute novelty is
required in order to obtain a Soviet patent; the invention must not have
9 9Agreement Regarding Trade, supra note 26, art. IX(2).
10 Starr, supra note 89, at 106.
1°Van Dyke, Industrial Property Protection in the U.S.S.R., in BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. at 110 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
102Maggs, Legal Problems of Patents, Industrial Designs, Technical Data, Trademarks
and Copyrights in Soviet-American Trade, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 311 (1975).
'
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been disclosed in the U.S.S.R. or abroad to an indefinite number of
persons in such a way that its embodiment becomes possible.109
Trademark protection is available for both product and service
marks. Trademarks will not be in force until registered, and the first
applicant is entitled to registration regardless of prior use, although a
foreigner must establish use of the mark in commerce in order to file an
application. 110 Registration entitles the owner to exclusive use with a
right to prohibit imported or unauthorized products bearing the mark.
Registration will be denied if the mark is similar to one already
registered, or if the applicant's home country does not allow reciprocal
registration."' Registration is available for a maximum term of ten
years which can be extended, and rights can be licensed or assigned. 112
Licensing is controlled by a special FTO, v/o Licensintorg, which is
charged with acquiring licenses abroad and selling Soviet licenses to
foreign countries. Agreements are frequently made with the FTO for
the particular industry involved, but must comply with the set proce-
dures and with any relevant international agreements and be approved
by v/o Licensintorg.11 The SCST establishes priorities and makes final
decisions on the acquisition of foreign technology. Along with the FTO's,
the SCST is directly involved in licensing of technology. 114
Licenses usually run between five and ten years, with payment on a
lump-sum basis or in installments and in hard currency or in product.
Many variations are available but any license agreement will be ex-
tremely detailed and will involve hard bargaining. "1
E. Financing Practices
Financing imports into the Soviet Union is handled by the State
Bank [Gosbank], which controls the entire Soviet banking system and
participates in the formulation of the country's comprehensive
economic policy. The Foreign Trade Bank [Vneshtorgbank] is respon-
sible for administering foreign trade payments, providing credits to the
FTO's, and coordinating relations with Western financial institu-
tions. 116 In addition, four banks are owned and operated abroad by the
Soviet Union (in London, Paris, Zurich and Frankfurt) primarily to
finance short-term commercial transactions and to assist in the financ-
'
09Van Dyke, supra note 101, at 111.
11d. at 119.
' 
1 Kiralfy, supra note 75, at 333.
:
12Van Dyke, supra note 101, at 121.
13id. at 127.
114Kiralfy, supra note 75, at 336.
115ld. at 337.
Il6Anikin, Credit and Finance in Soviet Foreign Trade, in AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE: A
JOINT SEMINAR ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 27, 28 (U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce 1975).
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ing of medium-term projects when full Western credits are not availa-
ble.117
Vneshtorgbank functions as the recipient of credits in transactions
for the import of equipment and technology. 118 Since Vneshtorgbank
is a major international bank with a strong credit rating, the commer-
cial credit risk is very low in Soviet transactions. Unsecured credit
terms are common, though letters of credit remain the usual
method. 119 Low interest rates, generally six percent or slightly over,
are demanded by Soviet FTO's on the basis of their excellent payment
record. The difference between the low interest rate paid by the Soviets
and the prevailing interest rate is covered by the seller's profit margin.
Long term credit (up to fifteen years) is sought by the Soviets. 120
Limits on U.S. financing of exports to the Soviet Union curtail the
expansion of commercial relations. Some scholars have suggested that
the collapse of the 1972 Trade Agreement was caused as much by the
passage of legislation limiting Eximbank credit to the Soviet Union to
$300 million over four years, an amount "wholly inadequate to finance
tremendous Soviet imports of U.S. technology and equipment," as by
U.S. demands for changes in Soviet emigration policy. 121 American
commercial banks are limited by the Johnson Act of 1934 which
prohibits loans involving foreign governments which are in default on
their obligations to the United States; however, the Attorney General
has ruled that certain financing arrangements are outside the scope of
the Johnson Act. 122 Federally chartered banks are restricted to lending
a maximum of ten percent of their gross capital funds to a single
borrower. This "effectively limits the amount that the U.S. banking
system could have on loan at any one time to any one socialist country
to a theoretical maximum of about $2.0 billion."' 23 Export credits have
been made available through branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banks in
Europe, sometimes in conjunction with European or Japanese banks.
The limits on Eximbank activity in transactions with the Soviet
Union dampen the interest of commercial banks in this area, thus
compounding the adverse impact on our competitive posture.124 This
combined lending capacity cannot support any major portion of the
large transactions contemplated and already undertaken. Thus far,
"the vast majority of U.S. exports to socialist countries has been paid
in cash or has been financed by the commercial banking system."' 125
117Id. at 29.
1181d.
119OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 37, at 21.
120d.
2ISee, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 25, at 730.
"'OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 22.
123Morton, supra note 13, at 36.
124d. at 37.
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This is no longer an adequate source of financing. Government credits
are necessary if U.S. firms are to compete successfully with the firms of
other countries for Soviet business, especially for industrial coopera-
tion projects.
IV. Experience of U.S. Firms
A significant number of U.S. firms have now successfully con-
cluded trade and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. Some
projects have been completed or have made substantial progress, and
information on their experiences has been made available. These
experiences show that several steps are necessary before agreements
can be concluded.
Personal contact, preferably establishment of a continuing rela-
tionship, has been found essential even in the earliest stages of
negotiation. 126 A visit to the Moscow office of the FTO by high-ranking
representatives of the Western firm is recommended for presenting
promotional information. The staging of an international trade exhibit
to display the firm's products has become a popular method of making
a good impression on potentially valuable contacts.127
Many U.S. firms have signed protocol agreements with the SCST
to create an atmosphere of mutual goodwill and provide a framework
for future specific business transactions. 128 Protocols generally express
an intent to conduct joint research and development projects in a
certain industrial area.
The 1974 protocol between Sperry-Rand Corp. and the SCST
exemplifies such an agreement; it provided for the exchange of scien-
tific and technological information, joint analysis of technical prob-
lems, joint research and development, and consideration of eventual
licensing. 129 Tangible benefits were found to result from the protocol.
The ongoing relationship with the Soviet government that allowed
Sperry-Rand to obtain early information about profitable opportunities
and preferential treatment in the subsequent award of Soviet contracts
was a primary benefit. 130 Following a large 1974 exhibition of its full
line of computer systems, business machines, farm equipment, hyd-
raulic equipment, and consumer goods, Sperry-Rand received a $10
million order from Aeroflot for computerized reservation and air traffic
control systems. 131
126OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 37, at 14.
1271d
.
128U.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements with
the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, supra note 67.
1295 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 373-74 (1976).
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An Austrian company, Stolllack AG, signed the first such protocol
agreement with the SCST in 1968 for joint research and development
of industrial paints and processes for the automobile, wood, furniture
and leather industries. Stolllack AG reported similar improvements in
access to Soviet end-use industries and lessening of bureaucratic
procedures in further business dealings. 132
Between mid-1972 and late 1976, fifty-four such protocols were
signed by U.S. firms with the SCST. 133 In early 1977 Soviet authorities
indicated that in the future protocols would be signed with Western
firms only if concrete commercial possibilities were evident. Previously,
delays had been caused by administering numerous agreements with
little potential. 134 A frequently cited reason for the failure of more
protocols to result in cooperation projects is the Soviet Central Plan-
ning System.13 5 U.S. export controls have also thwarted several prop-
osed projects, usually those involving technology with military poten-
tial. 136
In negotiations pursuing the protocol agreements, N. Tretyukhin
and B. Borisov 137 have announced that buy-back agreements will be
favored. Coproduction and specialization agreements such as have
been successful with COMECON countries will also be considered.
These announcements came as a result of a new attitude toward
dependence on Western suppliers in areas not vital to the Soviet
economy or military. 138
The opening of permanent channels of communication, signing of
protocol agreements, and negotiation of preliminary contracts do not
automatically result in the conclusion of an industrial cooperation
agreement. In 1974, Gulf Oil began to investigate the possibility of
becoming involved in a joint project for the exploration of oil deposits
off the shore of the Soviet island of Sakhalin; in February, 1975 Gulf
signed a science and technology cooperation agreement with the
SCST 1 3 9 and was informed by Soviet authorities that the proposal was
being considered; 140 in November, 1975 Gulf signed with the Japanese
13 21d. at 273.
133U.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements with
the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, supra note 67.
1346 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 41.
1355 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 25.
13 6Denial of United States export licenses prevented the construction of a complex
for the production of commercial jet liners and the sale of a computer reservation
system, on the ground of "national interest." Osofsky, supra note 25, at 720, and 5
BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 51.
137N. Tretyukin is part of the Planning and Economics Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and B. Borisov is the President of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry.
1386 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 41-42.
13 9U.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements, supra
note 67.
140 Osofsky, supra note 25, at 723.
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Sakhalin Oil Development Company to provide consulting engineer-
ing services. 141 Negotiations continued over a two year period and no
agreement was ever reached on the extent of Gulf's participation and
interest in the proposed project. 142 Gulf did play a small part in the
initial exploration under the contract with the Japanese firm, but
eventually was replaced by a French firm with less sophisticated
technology that was adequate for Soviet purposes at that time. 143
Other U.S. firms interested in participating in the exploitation of
Soviet natural gas resources have made greater progress in their
negotiations than Gulf, although finalization of such arrangements
remains speculative. Tenneco, Inc., Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.,
and Brown & Root, Inc. approached the Soviet Union even before the
government-level trade discussions began between the United States
and the Soviet Union. This consortium of U.S. firms presented pre-
liminary proposals for major investment in the North Star Project for
the development of gas deposits in Western Siberia. 144 In early 1973,
Brown & Root signed a cooperation agreement with the SCST 14 5 and
later became one of the first U.S. firms to establish a permanent office
in Moscow. 14 6
These firms offered to provide equipment, technology and ser-
vices to explore the Urengoi field, construct a liquidation plant, and lay
a pipeline to transport the liquified natural gas [LNG] to other parts of
the Soviet Union. In return the firms would share in the output to be
shipped to the United States. 147 A twenty-five year term, with. ship-
ments of 2.1 billion cubic feet of LNG per day is contemplated. 148 The
major obstacle to the conclusion of arrangements is the Soviet re-
quirement that the project be completely financed by the U.S. firms
"from gas wellhead to export delivery point.' 1 49 Financing the esti-
mated $3 to $4 billion required could take years to arrange in light of
U.S. laws. The U.S. law limiting Eximbank credits available to the
Soviet Union to a total of $300 million, with a $40 million sublimit for
energy projects unless Congress passes specific enabling legislation
after determining that the project is in U.S. national interest is one
obstacle. 15 0 Another obstacle is the law restricting loans made by U.S.
1414 EASTERN EUROPE REPORTS, supra note 35, at 325.
142Interview with Gulf Oil official at Gulf's Washington, D. C. office on June 23,
1977.
143Id.
144 KOSNIK, supra note 41, at 45.
14sU.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements, supra
note 67.
146 Accredited U.S. Companies in Moscow, unpublished list supplied by U.S.S.R.
Affairs Division, Bureau of East-West Trade, U.S. Dep't of Commerce.
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commercial banks to a single entity to ten percent of the bank's net
worth. 151
In addition, Soviet policies hinder rapid conclusion of an agree-
ment despite the country's need for increased energy production to
promote industrial growth and generate hard currency. Any coopera-
tion project must be reflected in the Soviet economic plan, which may
take years in the case of such a major project. Once resources are
allocated to the project and future production is scheduled, no flexibil-
ity is provided to allow for unexpected developments.' 5 2 Although
estimated deposits are adequate to meet the demands of the current
plan for domestic and export needs, 15 3 and the Urengoi field clearly
has the capacity to supply the total quantity of LNG required to repay
U.S. investors without serious depletion, 154 Soviet officials periodi-
cally express concern over the appropriateness of pledging substantial
portions of their nation's energy reserves to the West.155
The extent of participation by the three U.S. firms in the North
Star Project has also been the subject of special consideration on both
sides due to the size of the investment required. The usual forms of
industrial cooperation agreement do not allow Western firms a voice in
the decision-making process, without which the firms are reluctant to
commit such a large amount of capital. 156 Soviet authorities determine
the direction and extent of industrial cooperation under these agree-
ments, and the Western firm must accept the internal operations of the
Soviet economy as a given.' 5 7 Compensation or buy-back provisions
are tailored to correspond to the importance of the project and the
foreign exchange allocation made in the annual import plan.' 5 8
In 1976 the Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister expressed con-
tinued Soviet interest in dealing with U.S. firms. He mentioned the
possibility of new types of arrangements allowing the firms to control
product quality and to "participate in the investment cost" of facilities
they provide.' 5 9 Another Soviet spokesman stated that
practice will suggest forms of cooperation providing a mutually
acceptable basis for settling matters like a guaranteed share of the
profits of the enterprise being set up with the assistance of the
foreign investor, the latter's say in the technical and commercial
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Soviet consideration of foreign ownership shares in joint ventures as a
way to avoid committing such a large share of the country's resources
for the repayment of loans indicates a softening of the Soviet position
toward Westerners. 161
Without such concessions by the Soviet Union, U.S. firms would
hesitate to commit further capital to the development of Siberian
resources, as international political relations are deteriorating and
substantial funds are required for energy projects in other countries.162
Experience of Occidental Petroleum
The U.S. firm with the most substantial investment and promising
prospects for future cooperation projects in the Soviet Union is Occi-
dental Petroleum. Occidental's president, Armand Hammer, is one of
the leading proponents of expanded commercial relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union. As early as July 1972, Occidental
became one of the first U.S. firms to sign a science and technology
cooperation agreement with SCST. 163 The cooperation agreement re-
sulted in an Occidental subsidiary signing a counterpurchase agree-
ment by the end of the year. 164
Then another Occidental subsidiary, Hooker Chemical Corp.,
concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Trade in April
1973. Hooker Chemical Corp. agreed to exchange large quantities of
superphosphoric acid [SPA], a chemical fertilizer, for an equivalent
amount of Soviet-produced ammonia, urea and potash. 165 The De-
partment of Commerce approved the transaction since the United
States has a surplus of phosphate rock and the products to be imported
from the Soviet Union are in short supply in the United States due to
the shortage of natural gas.
During late 1973 and throughout 1974, the parties negotiated
specific terms for the various contracts implementing the chemical
barter transaction. The Soviet Union agreed to provide over $360
million for financing the construction of the fertilizer complex in the
United States. 166 Occidental/Hooker agreed to supply technology,
equipment, materials and services to enable the Soviets to construct
pipelines for ammonia, terminals for ammonia, urea and SPA, and
railroad car tanks for SPA. 167 These products are to be of U.S. origin
wherever possible and are to be financed with credits obtained by the
1 6 1 DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S.S.R., supra note 64, at X-3.
16 2 FRIESEN, supra note 65, at 144.
163U.S. Companies with Science and Technology Cooperation Agreements, supra
note 67.
164Occidental Petroleum Co., Prospectus, April 10, 1974, at 52. [hereinafter cited
as Occidental Prospectus].
'65Occidental Petroleum Co., 1973 Annual Report to Stockholders 49.
1661d"
'67Occidental Petroleum Co., Form 10-K, 1973 Annual Report to the SEC 23,
[hereinafter cited as Occidental, 1973 10-K Form].
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Soviet Union, $180 million from Eximbank and $180 million from U.S.
commercial banks. 16 To generate funds to repay these credits,
Occidental/Hooker agreed to purchase a maximum of 1.6 million metric
tons of ammonia per year in additon to the amount obtained under the
barter, until the debt is repaid. 169
During the 1974 negotiations, Occidental/Hooker agreed to begin
purchasing ammonia, urea and potash at Soviet ports in 1978 and to
begin deliveries of SPA at that time. 170 The amount of SPA for 1978 is
to be 10,000 metric tons, rising to a minimum of 480,000 metric tons in
1979 and one million metric tons per year for 1980 through 1997.171 By
1975, it was apparent that the prices fixed for the 1978 deliveries of SPA
had been fixed at a level substantially lower than the current domestic
price and production cost, but fortunately prices for 1979 deliveries
had not been fixed during the 1974 negotiations. 172 Prices for the
ammonia and urea, which will determine the amounts to be sold, will
be based on the level of prices in the U.S. domestic market and world
markets each year, subject to certain minimums. 173 The amounts of
ammonia, urea and potash are set according to SPA amounts, with the
annual sales price for each fertilizer component to be established six
months in advance of each contract year.
Under a separate contract, Occidental/Hooker agreed to purchase
an additional 600,000 metric tons of ammonia per year for ten years
beginning in 1978.174 Two fixed-price contracts at $100 were signed in
June 1974 for the construction of the port and pipeline facilities. 175
In October 1975, Occidental and an unrelated French corporation
contracted with the Soviet Union to supply $300 million in technology,
design, equipment and construction supervision for an additional
ammonia pipeline system. 17 6 According to subsequent agreements,
Occidental alone would supply equipment, materials and technical
documentation constituting twenty-five percent of the supply portion
of the original contract.177 Occidental reported to the SEC that "work
under all three contracts is proceeding on schedule."'1 78
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In November 1975, a Hooker subsidiary signed a protocol with
the Soviet Ministry of Chemical Industries. The protocol contemplates
a cooperation project for the production of caustic soda and
chlorine. 179 The project is expected to be developed like the fertilizer
transaction once financing is arranged.
Occidental is involved in other major commercial transactions
with the Soviet Union. In 1973, another Occidental subsidiary, Garrett
Research and Development Company, signed a contract to design an
international trade center in Moscow. 180 Occidental was to serve as
general contractor for the entire project and to obtain American sub-
contracts for equipment and services. 181 Eximbank agreed to provide
$36 million in credits, with Chase Manhattan Bank supplying the
remainder of the $110 million needed.1 8 2 Design work was completed
for the trade center in December 1975, and in March, 1976, Occidental
contracted to provide procurement and technical assistance during the
construction of the trade center. 18 3 Under the latter contract, Occiden-
tal procured material, equipment and systems from U.S. suppliers. 184
In early 1974, Occidental signed a preliminaryagreement with El
Paso Natural Gas Co. and a Japanese consortium to form a joint
venture for the exploration and development of natural gas fields in
the Yakutsk area of Siberia.1 85 In November 1974, these parties con-
cluded an agreement with the Soviet Union to seek the estimated $400
million financing needed to begin exploration. Repayment for the
exploration is to be in exports of liquified natural gas .186 A long-term
purchase of 20 billion cubic meters per year is contemplated. Occiden-
tal would have a twenty-five percent interest in production, increasing
to a one-third share of LNG in excess of 1.5 million cubic feet per day.
Occidental's interest is to be adjusted to reflect the eventual purchase
of half of the production of the field by the Japanese.1 8 7 Once explora-
tion begins, an estimated $5 to $6 billion investment over the sub-
sequent five-year period is anticipated.' 88 Initial financing is to be
sought from the Eximbanks of the United States and Japan, and from
commercial banks in both countries. 189
While these projects seem to indicate increased cooperation on
natural gas exploration in the Soviet Union, the Soviets are now
179 Occidental, 1975 10-K Form, supra note 172, at 30.
IsOOccidental, 1974 10-K Form, supra note 170, at 68.
MU1ld.
18 2Osofsky, supra note 25, at 721.
18 3 Occidental, 1975 10-K Form, supra note 172, at 31.
18 4 Occidental Petroleum Co., Form 10-K, Annual Report to the SEC 26.
1' 5Occidental Prospectus, supra note 164, at 52.
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shifting their focus to other resources. Preservation of petroleum and
gas reserves, which will be needed in the future, concerns the Soviets.
Therefore, the Soviets are now shifting the focus of their energy
programs to coal use and production.' 90
Economic and Political Considerations
The Soviet Union's acquisition of U.S. technology, methodology
and advanced equipment through industrial cooperation projects, and
the resulting growth in economic interdependence, have generated
concern as to whether such transactions are in the best interests of the
United States. However, the United States has many controls on trade
with the Soviet Union. The export of goods and data of possible
strategic importance is effectively controlled by the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969; the Department of Commerce seeks clearance from
both the State and Defense Departments before granting licenses for
export to the Soviet Union. The Department of Commerce has denied
export licenses for certain types of heavy equipment technology' 91 and
complex computer systems. 192 Due to the sharp separation of the
military and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy and the cumber-
some planning procedures which prevent any effective cross-filtering
of developments, even vast computer and industrial process systems
adapted to the civilian economy are unlikely to be used by the milit-
ary. 193 The United States has recently changed its policy to reduce
delays in granting export licenses and effect license denials only where
the product is of definite military significance.
Sales of non-strategic technology to socialist countries are no more
harmful to U.S. interests than similar sales to non-socialist countries,
with one exception: narrowing the technological gap between East and
West is a political disadvantage. In reality, however, U.S. develop-
ments in many areas are only a few years ahead of Soviet technology
and, in other areas, are behind Soviet technology, particularly for wide
diameter pipelines, large-scale turbines and certain steelmaking pro-
cedures. 194 While the Soviet Union clearly needs technological exper-
tise for its computer, electronic, chemical and truck-building indus-
tries, mere examination of a purchased product is ordinarily not
sufficient to reveal manufacturing technology. When the technology is
obtained, Soviet economic practices and policies hinder any further
technological progress. 195 Acquisition of U.S. technology in the past
has not allowed the Soviets to advance to a leadership position in the
190 FRIESEN, supra note 65, at 19.
19 1OsOFsKY, supra note 25, at 720.
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field and is unlikely to do so in the future, in the absence of internal
reform. 196
American technology is available to other Western nations, and if
U.S. firms forego transactions, it is likely that another Western country
will provide the same or equivalent technology. The U.S. market can
be protected from disruption by procedures outlined in the 1972 Trade
Agreement and by tariffs and duties already imposed. The role of
Western technology in the Soviet economy is insubstantial; total im-
ports of technology-embodying manufactured goods from the indus-
trialized West comprised only one-half of one percent of the Soviet
GNP in 1974.197
Evaluation of the possible disadvantages to U.S. economic and
political interests requires balancing against the probable advantages.
Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union has weighed
heavily in favor of the U.S. balance of payments; total trade reached a
new record of $2.5 billion in 1976, of which more than $2.3 billion was
in U.S. exports. 198 But while the dollar value of U.S. machinery and
equipment exports has increased, the U.S. share of Soviet orders
placed in the West has dropped from a high of twenty-two percent in
1974 to twelve percent in 1976.199 Continued decline is projected,
unless cooperation arrangements can be made to alleviate Soviet hard
currency problems. 20 0
Expanded commercial dealings with the Soviet Union provide
growth incentives for the U.S. domestic market by creating more jobs
and supplying income for investment in the development of new
technology. Certain benefits will accrue to the United States from joint
research and development arrangements, because the quality of Soviet
research is exceptionally high and the number of Soviet scientists and
engineers who concentrate in theoretical fields of chemistry, physics
and mathematics is greater. 20 1 In addition, the United States cannot
afford to forego a major source of raw materials and energy which
industrial cooperation projects potentially offer.
U.S.-Soviet trade as a whole is expected to suffer from the increase
in political tensions between the two countries under the Carter
Administration. Immediately following the rejection of the 1972 Trade
Agreement, the Soviet Union attempted to shift orders placed with
U.S. firms to other Western sources. While industrial projects already
underway were continued, Soviet authorities ordered that subcon-
1 9 6 KOSNIK, supra note 41, at 139.
197THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 13, at 47.
198U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 77-27 at 9 (June 1977).
199U.S.S.R.: New Initiatives are Key to Expanded Trade with U.S., in COMMERCE
AMERICA (January 31, 1977).
2
°°U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 77-17 at 4 (March 1977).
20 1FRIESEN, supra note 65, at 32.
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tracts were to be given to Western European firms whenever possi-
ble. 202 At a 1976 meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic
Council in Moscow, General Secretary Brezhnev stated that projected
growth in U.S.-Soviet trade would be reached only if U.S. tariff and
credit discriminations were ended. U.S. Treasury Secretary William
Simon's report that continued growth in trade statistics reflected
shipments on back orders and contracts signed in the past and that
current orders were lagging reinforced Brezhnev's remarks. 20 3 Soviet
orders will continue to be made for U.S. commodities essential- to
planned industrial and agricultural expansion when the U.S. com-
modities are clearly superior to European or Japanese counterparts.
Similarly, industrial cooperation projects will be arranged with U.S.
firms having superior technology where that technology is necessary.
However, no major cooperation agreements for energy projects with
U.S. firms have been finalized in the last two years, and negotiations to
implement past agreements have been progressing slowly, if at all.
2026 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 113.
2035 BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 389-90.
